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Abstract 
 
The paper outlines accounting irregularities which led to the near collapse of Semple 
Cochrane, one of last cases brought before a Tribunal under the aegis of the United 
Kingdom’s Joint Disciplinary Scheme.  The accounting issues at stake provide a backdrop to 
an exploration of the role of the external auditors within corporate governance, the notion of 
expertise within the accounting profession, and possible limitations on what auditors can, and 
cannot, achieve, issues which remain at the centre of discussion on the role and value of 
audit. 
 
 
 
 
  
 2 
Introduction and Background 
 
Semple Cochrane was one of the last cases brought before a Tribunal under the aegis of the 
Joint Disciplinary Scheme (JDS)
1
 of the professional accounting bodies. Although the 
complaints made related to activities in the final years of the last century – the company all 
but collapsed in early 2000 – the judgments of the Tribunal were not finally given until 2008. 
As compared with other more high profile later JDS cases, most notably that relating to Ernst 
& Young’s role in the audit of Equitable Life, Semple Cochrane has attracted very little 
attention in professional literature or the media more widely (and almost none at all outside 
Scotland) – but it is an interesting case and one which is worth further examination on a 
number of levels. One reason for its relative lack of exposure might be that it is a case 
relating to a medium sized Scottish firm primarily engaged in electrical engineering and 
therefore does not have the immediacy of interest amongst wider stakeholders which JDS 
cases such as Equitable Life, or earlier those relating to Maxwell and Polly Peck, had. 
Another might be that it is a complicated case with a dramatis personae of which Shakespeare 
would have been proud and one, where again in many respects similar to Shakespearian 
plays, it is often difficult to ascertain the underlying motivations of the various actors 
involved. 
 
The judgments
2
 and associated material relating to the various complaints run to more 
than 650 pages, and it is therefore an impossible task to do justice to all the various issues and 
nuances which arose and were considered by the Tribunal within the confines of a short 
article such as this one. The variety of themes which could be developed from the underlying 
                                                 
1
 A review of the role of the Joint Disciplinary Scheme can be found in M Chance  (1993) The Accountants’ 
Joint Disciplinary Scheme, JFRC, 2(1), pp.22 – 30. Equitable Life and Semple Cochrane were the JDS’ last 
cases, both concluded in 2010.  From 2005, the JDS was effectively replaced by the Accounting and Actuarial 
Disciplinary Board (AADB), a body within the Financial Reporting Council (FRC).  The AADB, in turn, was 
replaced in November 2012 by the FRC’s Conduct Committee. 
2
 There were two separate judgments.  The first, in relation to complaints against past and present members of 
Deloitte and Touche and the firm itself, is the main focus for examination in this article and is referenced as TR1 
(and the relevant appendix to the report as TR1A). Joint Disciplinary Tribunal (2008). Complaint against John 
(Ian) Durie, David John Crawford and Marshall William Miller, and Deloitte & Touche (TR1). The second, 
which relates to complaints against a member of the Semple Cochrane board who was a member of the Institute 
of Chartered Accounts of Scotland, is not considered in detail here, although there is some use of background 
material contained in the Tribunal report. All the complaints against this individual were dismissed. This report 
is referenced as TR2 (and the relevant appendix to the report as TR2A). Joint Disciplinary Tribunal (2008). 
Complaint against Mr William Wilson Evans (TR2). Access to these reports is not that straightforward as, 
following the cessation of activity of the JDS, its website on which they were available electronically was taken 
down; however, they should be available in hard copy on application to ICAS or ICAEW, or at their respective 
libraries. 
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material is diverse and includes, inter alia, more specific accounting issues as to the manner 
in which notions expressed in terms such as ‘reasonable certainty’ should be interpreted 
within the accounting framework and wider issues as to the nature and purpose of corporate 
governance.  Semple Cochrane was arguably one of the few documented cases where non-
executive directors tried to make a difference, but were in fact foiled by a combination of 
dominant executive management and an unfortunate alliance, no doubt completely 
inadvertent, of outside consultants and the company’s professional advisers.3 These themes 
are explored in a forthcoming, related article, but here the focus is confined to a 
straightforward consideration of the accounting issues at stake, the role of the external 
auditors, and a brief discussion of the notion of expertise within the accounting and auditing 
profession and of possible limitations on what auditors can, and cannot, achieve.
4
 
 
Semple Cochrane was a medium sized firm providing engineering and building 
services and was headquartered in Paisley south west of Glasgow. In late 1996 it made a 
placing of shares and was then admitted to the official list of the London Stock Exchange. At 
that point in time it was valued in the market at approximately £14 million. It continued to 
expand and the share price more than doubled within two years. However, in March 2000 the 
chairman, Dr Tom Clark, who had been a dominant presence in the company for twenty years 
or so, resigned,
5
 and the share price plunged
6
 as questions were raised about the quality of the 
company’s accounting practices and the extent of its debt levels; as noted above, the 
company came very close to complete collapse. In the meantime, a reshaped board had 
commissioned an investigation by Ernst & Young into the company’s finances, and a restated 
set of interim accounts for the six months ending 31 December 1999 portrayed significant 
write offs virtually across the board.   
 
In December 2000, following a complaint made to ICAS by a previous non-executive 
director of Semple Cochrane, the JDS began an investigation. This resulted in June 2004 in 
Executive Counsel for the JDS laying a number of complaints against both individuals with 
                                                 
3
 And arguably, but without any fault on its part, by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland. 
4
 D Gwilliam and O Marnet (2015).  Semple Cochrane – When Non-Executive Directors try to make a 
difference, does anybody listen?  Working Paper. 
5
 For many years he had combined the roles of chairman and chief executive but had stood down as chief 
executive in late 1999. 
6
 In 1999 the share price had touched £5, in June 2002 it was around 9p. Investors Chronicle (07/06/2002). 
Semple share.  Available at: http://www.investorschronicle.co.uk/2012/03/07/semple-share-
SdiEkoM2bysK7vWUgEs4SO/article.html. 
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then present or past association with Deloitte & Touche and against Deloitte & Touche itself. 
The nature of the complaints varied as they related to both individuals and the firm but their 
primary direction was in relation to the audit of Semple Cochrane’s accounts for the years 
ending June 1996 through to June 1999 and the work of Rutherford Manson and Dowds 
(RMD) as reporting accountants in relation to the November 1996 Stock Exchange flotation. 
RMD had been the auditors of Semple Cochrane for a number of years,
7
 but in July 1999 
their practice was absorbed into that of Deloitte & Touche (now Deloitte)
8
 and the 1999 audit 
was signed off in the name of Deloitte & Touche. In the outcome all the complaints against 
individuals and Deloitte & Touche were dismissed with the exception of one made against 
RMD for not maintaining adequate audit records, although no penalty was levied in respect 
of this. 
 
Accounting and Audit Issues 
 
As noted above, the accounting and audit issues were many and by no means homogenous in 
their nature, but the great majority lay in respect of the valuation of contracts, both long and 
short term, entered into by Semple Cochrane. Perhaps the central and best known issue 
related to the valuation of a long term contract entered into in connection with the refitting of 
a ship, the Sir Bedivere,
9
 which had been extensively damaged during the Falklands war and 
was being rebuilt and refitted in a Scottish dockyard. Semple Cochrane was not the main 
contractor on the project, but it was responsible for the supply and installation of electrical 
systems on board and acted as a sub-contractor accordingly. 
 
Accountants and auditors have, traditionally at least, been seen as cautious in terms of 
the recognition of profit before its amount can be ascertained appropriately.
10
 However, it has 
long been recognised that if some element of the profit on long term contracts is not ‘booked’ 
during the lifetime of that project then a misleading picture as to the activities of the entity 
during any one accounting period is likely to be presented to the shareholders and other 
stakeholders, and also that if it is not so booked, then management are provided with 
                                                 
7
 Their first audit was for the year ended June 1995. 
8
 Strictly speaking the ultimate parent body is apparently Deloitte Touche Tomhatsu, a UK private company 
limited by guarantee, but today they normally term themselves and are referred to as Deloitte. 
9
 Bedivere was the Arthurian knight responsible for returning Excalibur to the Lady of the Lake. 
10
 Here again because of considerations of space and immediate relevance a very simplified version of the wide 
range of issues associated with ‘profit’ recognition is presented. 
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considerable discretion as to when they do in fact choose to finally book the full profit 
amount in terms of decisions as to when a project has finally been completed. Consequently 
SSAP 9
11
 (first issued in 1975 and revised in 1988 and 2001) required that: 
‘Where it is considered that the out-come of a long term contract can be assessed with 
reasonable certainty before its conclusion, the prudently calculated attributable profit should 
be reported in the profit and loss account as the difference between the reported turnover and 
related costs for that project.’12 
 
However, it also provided that:  
‘…if it is expected that there will be a loss on a contract as a whole, all of the loss should be 
recognised as soon as it is foreseen…’,13 
and in an Appendix which was strictly speaking not part of the standard but only general 
guidance, reference was made to the issue of variations and claims: 
 
‘Where approved variations have been made to a contract …and the amount to be received in 
respect of those variations has not yet been settled and is likely to be a material figure in the 
outcome it is necessary to make a conservative estimate of the amount likely to be 
received…’14 
 
‘The settlement of claims arising from circumstances not envisaged in the contract…is subject 
to a high level of uncertainty…it is generally prudent to recognise receipts in respect of such 
claims only when negotiations have reached an advanced stage and there is sufficient 
evidence of the acceptability of the claim in principle to the purchaser, with an indication of 
the amount involved also being available.’15  
 
Semple Cochrane’s published accounting policy was consistent with the requirements 
of SSAP 9 although there was a change of emphasis between 1996 and 1997 when the 
policies stated that ‘Revenues derived from variations on contracts are recognised only when they 
have been accepted by the customer,’ and 1998 and 1999 when the wording was ‘Revenues 
derived from variations on contracts are recognised only when the final outcome can be assessed with 
reasonable certainty.’16 
 
Although the principle underlying the standard and its successors has the support of  
almost all practising accountants and users of accounting information, there are formidable 
practical problems in determining what the outcome of a long term contract is likely to be and 
also of the appropriate means to allocate that profit over time. Put simply, the gist of the JDS 
                                                 
11
 Accounting Standards Board (1975).  Statement of Standard Accounting Practice 9 (SSAP 9). Stocks and 
Long Term Contracts. (First issued in 1975, revised 1988 and 2001). FRC: London. 
12
 TR1 pp 22-23. 
13
 Ibid., p 23. 
14
 SSAP 9 Appendix 1 para 26 quoted at TR2 p 27. 
15
 Ibid., Appendix 1 para 27 quoted at TR2 p 27. 
16
 TR1 p 25. 
 6 
complaint in this particular instance was that Semple Cochrane booked profit (or failed to 
make an appropriate write-off ) on the Sir Bedivere contract in 1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999 
when in fact there was not ‘reasonable certainty’ as to a profitable outcome. In 1996 Semple 
Cochrane according to the JDS complaint recognised £582,000 profit, and the accumulated 
amount had risen to £623,000 by 1997 and £671,000 by 1998.
17
 In respect to the accounting 
treatment the JDS asserted that the auditors were, or should have been, aware that there was 
not sufficient evidence to support the estimates in relation to costs to completion that the 
company was making, or as to expected further revenue attributable to anticipated variations 
in the terms of the contract.  
 
The JDS complaint in respect to the 1996 audit was couched as follows:  
 
‘In particular the auditors failed properly to review the Sir Bedivere contract which had been 
substantially delayed and was still in progress on 30 June 1996….Semple Cochrane 
recognised a profit of £582,000 on this contract, which was accepted by the auditors, 
although there was inadequate evidence to do so either in accordance with the company’s 
stated accounting policy…or with the requirements of SSAP 9. The outcome of this contract 
could not be assessed with reasonable certainty, as there was no audit evidence to support the 
value attributed to variations of £550,000 or the costs to complete the contract of £1,277,000 
(£2,500,000 less £1,223,000 incurred). The auditors themselves noted the absence of any 
records to support the total cost estimate of £2,500,000. Moreover only a small element of the 
labour cost had actually been incurred indicating the outcome of the contract was uncertain. 
The profit of £582,000 was approximately double the level anticipated in the company’s 
original tender for the contract…’18 
 
There is some suggestion in the Tribunal report that in that year the auditors had 
advocated writing down this profit recognition by £290,000 – but it does not appear that this 
write down actually took place.
19
 
 
Without rehearsing in detail the complaints relating to subsequent years, it is clear that 
over this period of time the auditors became aware that Semple Cochrane was in dispute with 
the main contractors over the fulfilment of the contract, and it was suggested by the JDS that 
this should have made them even more cautious as to profit recognition ahead of the 
completion. For example, in respect to the complaint in relation to the 1997 audit: 
                                                 
17
 The actual amounts recognised in the profit and loss statement were to an extent disputed in evidence before 
the Tribunal but there was agreement that there was profit recognition which was material in the context of the 
Semple Cochrane accounts – and in fact in the outcome the Financial Director did appear to accept the JDS 
figures as accurate (TR2 p 130). 
18
 TR1 p 35. 
19
 TR2 p 130. 
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“Furthermore the working papers in respect of the Sir Bedivere contract contained a note 
indicating a substantial claim, which would have further called into question the attribution 
of profits to that contract, but the team did not follow up that issue.”20 
 
In the final outcome Semple Cochrane was unable to pursue successfully its ambitions to 
renegotiate the contract in accordance with the terms it considered appropriate and had to 
settle for a much reduced final sum; in consequence, the interim figures for the six months 
ending 31 December 1999 showed an exceptional charge of £1.67m in respect of the Sir 
Bedivere contract. 
 
Similar, although not identical, issues arose in respect to two contracts to provide 
lighting on the M8 motorway. These contracts were entered into with the Scottish Office (via 
Renfrewshire Council acting as agents ) and were carried out and  completed in 1997 and 
were not therefore long-term contracts per se.
21
  However, the final financial outcome was 
still in dispute in 1998 and 1999, and there was extensive debate as to entitlements for early 
completion and responsibilities for delay. In this regard, the first JDS complaint was made in 
respect of the 1998 audit: 
 
‘The auditors’ review of other contracts was inadequate, as there was insufficient evidence to 
show that their outcome could be assessed with reasonable certainty. Examples of such 
inadequate review include the M8 contract, the Redford Barracks, Edinburgh contract, the 
M77 contract (which in their planning document, the audit team recognised would require 
extensive field work along with the Sir Bedivere contract) and the A1(M) Alconbury 
contract’,22 
 
and in respect of the 1999 audit the complaint was stronger: 
 
‘The auditors reviewed the two M8 contracts which although carried out in 1997, were still in 
dispute in 1999. The outcome of the contracts could not be assessed with reasonable certainty 
and no attributable profit should have been recognised on them. Mr Miller appears to have 
reached a view on the prospects of the company’s claim on the balance of probability. SSAP 9 
gives no sanction for this approach. Mr Miller should have called for a reduction in turnover 
and profit of at least £200,000. He did not do so.’23 
 
                                                 
20
 TR1 p 49. 
21
 Not that Semple Cochrane appear to have made a very clear distinction between short and long term contracts 
– the JDS complaint stated that: ‘The majority by number of Semple Cochrane’s contracts were of a short term 
nature, but were accounted for on the same basis as long term contract.’  TR1A p 5. 
22
 TR1A p 16. 
23
 Ibid, p 18. 
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Other contracts where significant issues arose lay in relation to Redford Barracks in 
Edinburgh where, yet again, there were disputes with the main contractor. The 1998 
complaint is detailed above; again by 1999 it had become stronger: 
 
‘ The auditors reviewed only one of the three contracts which the company had in relation to 
Redford Barracks, Edinburgh and discovered that the company had improperly accounted for 
a disputed claim. They correctly realised that this increased the loss shown on the contract. 
The auditors did not review the other two contracts, although they were aware that there 
were disputes with the main contractor on each and that the company’s method of accounting 
enabled claims to be recognised prematurely. Nor did they visit the company’s Edinburgh 
office where the relevant contract files were held. Had they done so, they might have 
discovered the substantial overvaluation of the Edinburgh contracts which was disclosed to 
the board in April 2000.’24 
 
The evidence relating to the manner in which these contracts were accounted for as discussed 
by the Tribunal report
25
 is not that easy to follow, either as to the extent to which an actual 
provision was made or how that related to the auditors’ awareness that there had been internal 
discussion as to the possible need for a provision of £190,000 against the three contracts, but 
in the outcome substantial losses were booked on these contracts in the subsequently revised 
figures.   
 
Another contract where the possibility of further auditor caution and scepticism might 
have arisen lay in what was known as the Acton Bridge painting contract which had been 
entered into only four months before the 1999 year-end at a contract price of £289,000. 
However, by the year-end variation claims of £661,000 were accounted for giving rise to a 
company valuation of the contract of £950,000, which Deloitte & Touche suggested adjusting 
down to £900,000. At the 1999 year-end only £70,000 had been paid to the relevant Semple 
Cochrane subsidiary. Here the JDS complaint asserted that: 
 
‘The outcome of the contract could not be assessed with reasonable certainty. The auditors 
were aware that the accounting value included large unresolved claims and that they needed 
to obtain full documentation, but they did not obtain independent evidence and did not ask to 
see essential contract documents including correspondence with the main contractors. In the 
event, the contract had still not been resolved when the revised interim accounts for the six 
months ended 31 December 1999 were announced on 20 June 2000. The loss on the contract 
incorporated into these accounts amounted to £1.14 million of which £600,000 was treated as 
a prior year adjustment at 30 June 1999.’ 
 
                                                 
24
 TR1A pp 18-19. 
25
 TR1 pp 280-287. 
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Again there was evidence that the auditors were aware of problems relating to this contract. A 
file note prepared by the audit manager dated 14 September 1999 stated: 
 
‘WIP 
 
The major issue on the job is the Acton Bridge contract which is currently in dispute. This 
contract has been reviewed in detail and a potential adjustment of £200k reduction in profit 
exists based on the audit work performed to date. This is because a potential loss of £145k 
exists and the client has taken a £48k profit to 30/6/1999.’26 
 
But in the outcome a provision of only £50,000 was made. 
 
A final interrelated, but separate, issue which was discussed in detail related to the 
audit of what are termed ‘Account Holding Numbers’. These appear to have been nine 
‘suspense’ accounts amounting in total to slightly more than £681,000 and were treated in the 
accounts as work in progress. Again the nature of the complaint relating to the 1999 audit 
was direct: 
 
‘[These were] not contract accounts but suspense accounts for costs which had not been 
attributed to particular contracts…. These sums should not have been treated as work in 
progress but should have been written off. The auditors accepted a false oral explanation of 
the one account which they found when they could easily have checked it but did not do so. 
The auditors knew from previous audits, and from a warning about suspense accounts in an 
internal audit report, that such accounts might exist. Moreover the auditors failed to comply 
with their firm’s standard procedures for suspense accounts. As a result of this failure the 
company’s assets and profits were materially overstated in the 1999 accounts’27 
 
Beyond this there was a whole string of issues raised in the JDS complaints relating to 
the 1999 accounts which do not appear to have been addressed in great detail by the Tribunal. 
These included the following: 
 
‘The auditors’ assessment of several other contracts was inappropriate. The outcome of the 
Braehead gantry contract could not be assessed with reasonable certainty and the auditors 
should not have accepted the forecast profit of £220,000 without obtaining more evidence. 
The auditors gave no reason for their recommended uplift of £40,000 on the profit on the 
Marchbanks contract, amounting to almost all the predicted profit on the contract when it 
was only fifty per cent completed. The provision for the dispute on the P&O Cruises (MV 
Victoria) contract in which the customer was refusing to pay £100,000, should have been 
about £60,000 not the £30,0000 which the auditors recommended…’28 
 
                                                 
26
 TR1 p 297. 
27
 TR2 pp 28-29. 
28
 TR1A p 18. 
 10 
‘The auditors noted a potential uplift of £52,000 profit on the company’s West 
Dunbartonshire contract, although there was no documentary evidence to support the 
amounts relating to the outcome of the contract, which was not completed at the year end. 
The auditors also understated the provision on the MV Global Snipe contract entered into by 
the subsidiary, Midland Ship Repairs Limited. The work on this contract was originally 
assessed at £10,000, then purportedly increased to £206,000 by oral agreement. That sum 
had been invoiced but not paid, the customer agreeing to pay £60,000. The auditors noted an 
adjustment of £73,000, being fifty per cent of the difference. The group’s solicitors expressed 
serious doubt to the auditors about the outcome of the claim and the ability to recover sums 
due from the customer which had sold the ship. In these circumstances prudence dictated 
writing the debt down to £60,000.”29 
“The auditors did not carry out any recorded audit work on the joint venture company 
Semple DHE Limited, a seventy-five per cent subsidiary of Semple Cochrane and signed an 
unqualified auditors’ report on its accounts for the period from 8 June 1998 to 30 June 1999, 
stating, inter alia, that an audit had been performed. This was untrue. Had a competent audit 
been performed, the auditors would have ascertained that a disputed delay and disruption 
claim of £416,000 had been wrongly accounted for and that a provision should have been 
made.’30 
 
And in terms of summary: 
 
‘In the event the auditors’ presentation to the audit committee showed potential adjustments 
with a net effect of a reduction in profit of £52,000. Had the audit team acted with due 
competence they would have identified overstatements of profit of at least £3.4m….The 
overstatements probably applied to many other contracts making the appropriate write down 
much greater.’31 
 
It is not immediately obvious why none of these issues appear to have been discussed in any 
detail; they all lay under complaint 5, that in relation to the Deloitte & Touche 1999 audit, but 
it is not clear that the JDS had withdrawn their concerns as to these matters, or that they had 
in any sense been struck out, and neither scenario is referred to in the Tribunal Report. 
 
Although as is clear from the above the complaints against the auditors were extensive, none 
of those detailed above were upheld by the Tribunal. Based on their own consideration of the 
documentary evidence, including that of expert witnesses, and the oral evidence given by the 
parties against whom the complaints had been made and also that of other witnesses, the 
Tribunal was of the view that in each and every circumstance that they discussed the auditors 
had come to a suitable judgment based on appropriately gathered evidence or that the 
complaint had not been established. Why they did so is an interesting question, although 
examination of the detailed evidence for each and every issue referred to above is a task 
which is not possible within the scope of this paper.  
                                                 
29
 Ibid, p 19 
30
 TR1A p 20. 
31
 Ibid, p 20. 
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It is difficult reading the Tribunal report at face value not to believe that in some 
instances at least the decisions were perverse.  It is certainly true that the revised interim 
accounts for the six months to 31 December 1999, which were presumably subject to detailed 
review by Ernst & Young as the auditors who had replaced Deloitte & Touche, showed a 
very different picture to those that had gone before. Provisions/losses were shown in respect 
to all the contracts referred to above, although some of them, including the £1.67m 
exceptional charge on the Sir Bedivere contract referred to above, were now treated as a prior 
year adjustment. In total there were asset value write downs of approximately £10m in the 
revised interim accounts, and without the support of the Bank of Scotland the company 
would almost certainly have collapsed completely. The final audited accounts for the year 
ended June 2000 showed prior year adjustments of £10.4m, £4.7m of which related to 1999 
and £5.7m to the earlier years. These prior year adjustments significantly exceeded the 
aggregate pre-tax profit of £7.7m recognised by Semple Cochrane in the five years between 
1995 and 1999.
32
 
 
If there is an explanation for the decisions of the Tribunal at the technical level it 
probably lies in the nature of the issues under examination. As discussed further below, 
contracts of the nature entered into by Semple Cochrane are complicated.  Issues as to the 
responsibility for non-performance often rise, claim and counter claim frequently ensue, and 
major contractual revisions are by no means unknown; in fact, they are commonplace. In 
such circumstances, provided that Semple Cochrane could adduce evidence, whether internal 
(including that pointing to a previously good track record for delivering contracts on time and 
to budget), or provided by independent specialist consultants,
33
 or on occasion letters from 
the company’s lawyers as to the likelihood of success if contractual disputes went to 
arbitration/the courts, then the ‘noise’ around the issues may have convinced the auditors that 
they could ‘live with’ the differences between the manner in which they might have wished 
the company to account and the manner in which it did in fact do so. Similar considerations 
may have persuaded the Tribunal that to hold the auditors to have been negligent in such 
circumstances would be inappropriate.  
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 TR2A pp 18-19. 
33
 Albeit consultants engaged by and paid for by Semple Cochrane rather than consultants engaged directly by 
RMD or Deloitte and Touche. There was questioning by the JDS of how independent at the least one of these 
consultants was but the Tribunal found no evidence that there was a genuine lack of independence. 
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Beyond the immediate technical level, one could also surmise and speculate as to 
wider institutional and sociological influences which might have led the Tribunal to come to 
the decisions that it did perhaps in the manner of perceptions and unconscious biases, issues 
which are briefly touched upon in an earlier paper by one of the authors (Gwilliam, D., 
2006)
34
 but that would be beyond the scope of this paper, although it might be worth 
exploration in future papers. 
 
Whilst it is true that the firm was absolved from blame on every count, it is difficult 
indeed to read the Tribunal report (and the associated one relating to the role of the finance 
director) without coming to the conclusion that this was not Deloitte & Touche’s finest hour, 
and of course they resigned as auditors in late 1999. Given the number of issues that were 
identified, and known to the auditors, where there was potential for overstatement of assets 
and profits which were highly material in the context of Semple Cochrane’s numbers, it is 
surprising that an overall audit perspective which would have reflected the total potential 
downsize risk was not adopted and in consequence would have led to more detailed and 
intensive questioning of the accounting numbers. There is also the issue of going concern:
35
 
auditors are required to form an opinion as to whether the company will continue as a going 
concern for a period of twelve months after the date of the financial statements. Given that 
Semple Cochrane was effectively on life support within not much more than six months of 
the signing off of the 1999 year end accounts, one would have to question the suitability of 
the auditors’ judgment in this respect, but this is an aspect of the audit role which is not 
referred to at all in the Tribunal report.  
 
When Deloitte & Touche took over the 1999 audit they must have been aware of 
enough ‘red flags’, as they are termed in the audit literature.36 to have supported a May Day 
parade. This was a new audit for them and they would, or should, necessarily have been 
cautious as to the quality of the audit work carried out by the previous firm of auditors which 
they had now taken over. The audit team knew that in June 1998 a non-executive director 
Dan Wright had taken over from Dr Clark as managing director, and that within a month he 
                                                 
34
 D Gwilliam, Audit quality and audit liability: a musical vignette, PN, vol. 22(1), 2006 pp 37-52. 
35
 The definition of ‘going concern’ in the standards is quite general. The current standard ISA (UK&I) 570 
defines ‘going concern’ as:  ‘Under the going concern assumption, an entity is viewed as continuing in business 
for the foreseeable future.’  
36
 A ‘red flag’ is seen as an indicator that issues and problems associated with the financial statements might 
arise during the course of the audit. 
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had resigned
37
 and Dr Clark had resumed his joint role as chairman and chief executive 
officer, a combination of posts explicitly frowned upon by the UK Corporate Governance 
Code. They knew that two non-executive directors in post at the 1999 year-end, both of 
whom had questioned aspects of accounting and governance within Semple Cochrane, had 
resigned in July 1999.
38
 They knew that one of these non-executive directors, an ICAS 
member, had previously sought the advice of ICAS as to the propriety of Semple Cochrane’s 
accounting treatment in respect to the Sir Bedivere contract.
39
 They knew that Semple 
Cochrane was a very rapidly growing listed company – turnover rose from £20.7m in 1996 to 
£57.3m in 1999 – and that in the past at least, questions had been asked about the number of 
qualified accounting staff in post. They were aware, or became aware of, internal audit 
reports which questioned the accuracy of Semple Cochrane’s contracting accounting system 
to predict costs to completion with any accuracy and therefore to predict profit on a contract 
with any certainty,
40
 and as the evidence before the Tribunal shows, they were aware, or 
became aware, during the course of the 1999 audit of a whole range of accounting and audit 
issues which needed to be addressed.  It should be noted that the senior audit team had 
effectively been the same as that of the previous year (and in fact as for the previous four 
years) and there is limited evidence in the Tribunal reports as to the extent that Deloitte & 
Touche sought to address the issues raised by the ‘red flags’ described above.   
 
Indeed, at the commencement of the 1999 audit, Semple Cochrane was classified as 
‘normal risk’ for audit purposes when in reality it was anything but.41 Perhaps the one 
significant contribution that Deloitte & Touche did make was to insist on the inclusion in the 
final accounts of a disclosure note as to the uncertainty of the outcome as to the Sir Bedivere 
contract, and they drew attention to this disclosure note in their audit report. The JDS thought 
that they should have done much more; they should have advised that ‘in order to comply with 
                                                 
37
 Ex post the Scottish media referred to this passage of time in the following terms: ‘The source, who has been 
extremely close to Semple Cochrane, said Wright and Clark had had a ''ferocious fight'' over the recognition of 
profits from this contract. He added that Wright had instigated an investigation into the contract immediately 
after he took up the chief executive post and had wanted to make provisions at that stage.’ Herald Scotland 7 
March 2000 available at: 
http://www.heraldscotland.com/sport/spl/aberdeen/semple-wrong-on-wright-issue-1.246176. 
38
 TR1 p 215. 
39
 Ibid, p 215. 
40
 TR1A p19.The JDS complaint also claimed that they failed to comply with SAS 500 by failing to review all 
internal audit reports and thereby failed to pick up on reports of various contract overvaluations and the 
existence of suspense accounts within the contract accounting system. As for SAS 500, see: Auditing Practice 
Board (1995). Statements of Auditing Standards 500 (SAS 500).  Considering the work of internal audit (Issued 
March 1995).  FRC: London.  
41
 TR1A p 16. In previous years RMD had also classified the Semple Cochrane audit as normal risk. 
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SSAP 9 and the company’s accounting policies, it was necessary for between £1m and £1.7m to be 
written off.’ They considered that in this context Deloitte & Touche had failed to adequately 
consider in the context of SAS 600
42
 whether the company’s accounting treatment had led to 
a material misstatement in the company’s accounts.43 
 
Why should this have come to pass? Here we shall focus on just two issues, the more 
specific one being the nature of the audit dynamics between Semple Cochrane, RMD and 
Deloitte & Touche, and the wider one relating to the notion of professional expertise within 
the accounting profession.  Rutherford Manson and Dowds was an Edinburgh firm of recent 
origin: it was founded in 1986 apparently by three college associates. It had developed a 
niche market in the financial sector and as we have seen was subsequently taken over by 
Deloitte & Touche. For a relatively small firm it had a significant external profile, but it is 
likely that Semple Cochrane was its only listed client in the industrial sector.  Indeed, there is 
reference in the Tribunal report to the fact that Semple Cochrane was the only listed company 
brought into the client portfolio of Deloitte & Touche’s Glasgow office as a result of the 
acquisition of RMD. 
 
Whether this made it less likely to question the accounting practices at a company which was 
perceived to be successful and expanding is a difficult question to answer, but it is possible. 
The takeover by Deloitte & Touche may have been triggered by a desire to add to its own 
practice in the financial sector or perhaps to acquire the talent within the firm.
44
 Whatever the 
reason it is unlikely that the audit of Semple Cochrane was in itself a key driver. There is 
some evidence in the Tribunal Reports that Deloitte & Touche were conscious of a need to 
ensure that auditing standards on the 1999 audit were in accordance with their own, and as 
we have seen they brought in one of their own partners to act as the Quality Control partner, 
but, as has been noted, the senior audit team on the 1999 audit consisted of the same 
individuals as had conducted the 1998 and earlier audits on behalf of RMD. 
 
These issues of specific expertise and possible desire to maintain the relationship with 
a listed client were, ex post, tangentially referred to in the Scottish print media: 
                                                 
42
 Auditing Practice Board (1993).  Statements of Auditing Standards 600 (SAS 600). Auditors’ reports on 
financial statements (Issued May 1993). FRC: London. 
43
 Ibid, p 17. 
44
 One of the founders Cahal Dowds became the youngest ever ICAS president in 2002 ahead of taking over as 
senior partner at Deloitte and Touche Scotland in 2003. Another ex RMD alumnus Roger Baird replaced him as 
head of Deloitte in Scotland in 2008.  
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‘One accountant with knowledge of the matter said: "Semple Cochrane was not a major 
account for Deloitte & Touche but in the case of RMD it was. What you had there was 
auditing work being done by a firm whose specialism lay elsewhere. Is there the possibility 
that what was done was not a great audit? Probably.’45 
 
The Nature of Audit Expertise 
 
Since the late nineteenth century expectations of the level of expertise to be provided by 
professional auditors has been defined in terms of the need for them to exhibit ‘reasonable 
skill and care’ in the conduct of their work, a duty which in this case was interpreted by the 
Tribunal as the level and skill of care to be expected of a competent professional accountant. 
However, when confronted with actual audit and accounting situations the translation of this 
essentially high level concept to relate to the day to day practicalities has not proved an easy 
task for the courts or for other entities with quasi-legal jurisdiction. Clearly standards change 
over time.  In a world in which there have been enormous changes in the nature and size of 
business, the educational and training requirements of professional accountants and the 
quality of internal control systems within companies, dramatic developments in information 
processing and IT more generally, and the introduction of codified accounting and auditing 
standards,
46
  one would hardly expect the standard of care required of Mr Theobald, the 
auditor in the London and General Bank case,
47
 to be the same as that which Deloitte & 
Touche were expected to exercise in their audit of Semple Cochrane, anymore that anyone 
visiting a general practitioner today would expect to receive the same care as would have 
been provided by a nineteenth century medical practitioner. 
 
One issue which has a bearing on this case is the manner in which auditors are expected to 
develop their skills and judgment beyond what is conventionally seen as their area of 
expertise in terms of their knowledge of accounting records and control systems and the 
suitability of the technical construction of published accounts into the areas of judgment 
                                                 
45
 The Scotsman (20/01/2002). UK auditors under fire in wake of Enron.  Available at:  
http://www.scotsman.com/business/finance/uk-auditors-under-fire-in-wake-of-enron-1-1359328.   
46
 As has been noted in previous articles in PN, e.g. D Gwilliam ‘Audit quality and audit liability: a musical 
vignette’ PN, 22(1), 2006 pp 37-52, the courts and related quasi-judicial bodies seem to exhibit a certain 
reluctance to engage with auditing standards. It is true that the only complaint upheld against RMD related to 
their failure to maintain proper audit working papers as required by SAS 230 for the years1996-1998 the JDS 
complaints contained reference to possible breaches of at least two other auditing standards neither of which 
were discussed at all in the Tribunal report. As for SAS 230, see: Auditing Practice Board (1995).  Statements of 
Auditing Standards 230 (SAS 230). Working papers (Issued March 1995).  FRC: London. 
47
 Re London and General Bank (No2) [1895]. 
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which underlie those accounts. At the end of the nineteenth century, in Re Kingston Cotton 
Mill Co. (No.2),
48
 it was accepted by the Court of Appeal that absent of any indications of 
untoward activity it was appropriate for the auditor to accept a management certificate as to 
the value of stock.
49
 Whilst it is very likely that in practice in the twentieth century auditors 
did make more exhaustive investigation of the nature of the numbers constituting stock, this 
ruling was not challenged directly in the courts until Re Thomas Gerrard,
50
 and even there 
Pennyquick J, side-stepped delicately around the issue of seeking to overturn the Kingston 
Cotton Mill decision by means of holding that there was evidence of untoward activity which 
the auditor was, or should have been, aware of.
51
  Today the development of practice and the 
introduction of codified standards make it quite clear that the auditor has to bring the value of 
stock within the ambit of conventional audit enquiry. 
 
A shift to a requirement for an auditor to obtain evidence either by themselves or from 
other independent parties in areas where significant judgment calls are made has been seen 
across a range of audit activities. To take one other example, in the past the auditors of 
insurance companies and similar financial institutions would accept the certificate of the 
designated Independent Actuary virtually without question; today they conduct a much more 
searching examination of the underlying assumptions and valuations and may indeed employ 
their own actuaries for that purpose. Here there are analogies with the issues surrounding the 
RMD, and then Deloitte & Touche, audits of Semple Cochrane. Few auditors are trained in 
either electrical engineering or the cut-throat business of contracting in the construction and 
engineering industries, in which variation orders frequently arise,
52
 and as has been noted 
above RMD was a firm which specialised primarily in the financial sector. In such 
circumstances it would have been difficult for the auditors to have questioned management 
assertions as to the likely outcome of contracts or the validity of claims made against Semple 
Cochrane. 
 
Given that the auditors were all but impotent to form their own independent view as 
to the likely outcomes of the wide range of problem contracts it is not at all surprising that 
                                                 
48
 In Re Kingston Cotton Mill Company (No. 2) {1892} 
49
 Ibid., 2 Ch. 279. 
50
 In Re Thomas Gerrard and Son Ltd [1967]. 
51
 Ibid. 2 All ER 525 at 536. 
52
 There were 85 variation orders on the Sir Bedivere contract in the year ending 1996 and an estimated further 
150 to 200 orders in the following year. TR2 p 136. TR1 p 77 states that there were nearly 1,500 specific 
variations on the contract. 
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they would have sought refuge in internally prepared company documentation and 
explanation, reports prepared by independent outside consultants (albeit consultants engaged 
by Semple Cochrane not RMD or Deloitte & Touche) and the opinions offered by Semple 
Cochrane’s legal advisers, opinions which at times had a flavour of the oracle at Delphi in 
terms of their ability to be interpreted by the various parties in the manner in which they 
chose to interpret them. The legal opinions and reports, of which Semple Cochrane obtained 
many, would on occasion vary in nuances of emphasis, sometimes quite significantly, 
depending on to which party they were to be presented. 
 
Whilst one might have some sympathy for the difficulties which would have 
confronted RMD and Deloitte & Touche as they conducted their audit work, others more 
critical of the audit profession would suggest that members of the audit profession, and 
particularly the large firms, hold themselves out as offering expertise across the entire range 
of industry, and they ought to have ensured that individuals with relevant expertise were 
allocated to the particular client.
53
 Furthermore, at an overall level they should have displayed 
a far more critical and sceptical attitude than they actually did.
54
 Again, those critical of the 
audit profession might say that the audits of Semple Cochrane which came under 
examination in this case bore a resemblance to the description of audit provided many years 
ago by John Stonehouse (the Labour minister and disgraced businessman who faked his own 
suicide after the collapse of the British Bangladesh Trust in 1974). Stonehouse considered 
audit to be a ritual gavotte in which the auditors asked questions, one provided them with the 
answers that they wanted to hear, they mulled over these answers for a time, and then signed 
off on the accounts and collected their fee. Those who would seek to defend the audit 
profession, and the individuals and firms associated with the audit of Semple Cochrane, 
would point out that faced with very wide range of complaints against them brought before a 
Tribunal headed by a retired Lord Advocate (the chief legal officer of state in Scotland) only 
one relatively minor complaint was upheld. 
 
 
                                                 
53
 Although the engagement partner did in fact claim to have substantial experience of the audit of 
manufacturing companies and of contract work in progress. TR2 p 58. 
54
 One example which might support this perspective is the fact that at the onset of the 1999 audit the 
engagement partner drafted a memo analysing Semple Cochrane’s system for accounting for contract work in 
progress. Inter alia this noted that: ‘The managers are in general prudent and do not take money up front on 
project. Instead the profit is taken on a pro rata basis for length of contract.’ TR2 p 95. 
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Concluding Reflections 
 
If it were not for the seriousness of the issues as they affected shareholders, and other 
stakeholders including creditors and perhaps most importantly employees, one would have to 
say that on occasion there were elements of near farce in some of the matters reported by the 
Tribunal. Semple Cochrane was a company which existed almost solely on the basis of 
contracts – it may have had as many as 1,000 of them open at any one time – yet  the finance 
director for much of the period under consideration, a qualified Scottish accountant, appears 
not to have been comfortable with his knowledge of SSAP 9.
55
 A non-executive director, 
himself a qualified Scottish accountant, raised issues with the finance director and came to 
the conclusion that the finance director knew nothing about SSAP 9, at which juncture he 
contacted ICAS to obtain a copy of the standard so as to refresh himself as to his own 
knowledge. Ernst & Young were asked to review the financial position in early 2000, and 
thereon followed very significant write downs and provisions, but in 1995 a report 
commissioned from Ernst & Young had reported that the accounting systems were of a good 
standard.
56
 At one stage the Tribunal appeared to support the perspective of the finance 
director that he could obtain significant comfort as to the quality of the internal systems from 
an ISO 9002 accreditation in 1992 and subsequent reaccreditation early in 1997.
57
 Views as 
to the value of such accreditation differ widely, but one would hope that the finance director 
would have been able to form his own perspective on the quality of systems in a company 
which was hardly a multi-national giant. John Ian Durie moved on to become finance director 
of Simclar – another West Scottish company with an entrepreneurial managing director – 
which subsequently experienced both financial setbacks and litigation as to the legality of 
certain of its dividend payments.
58
 The Deloitte response to the Tribunal findings was a 
                                                 
55
 In giving evidence to the Tribunal he stated that he was: ‘never very comfortable with SSAP 9, not least when 
complex issues arose’. TR2 p 116.  
56
 ‘The Tribunal agreed with the perspective of the RMD engagement partner that the 1995 E&Y report 
‘portrayed Semple as a growing and profitable business with good accounting controls and systems, and did not 
identify any areas of concern.’’ TR2 p 45. However it is also true that there were some specific criticisms in the 
E&Y report – although their overall perspective seems to have been that the contracts were conservatively 
managed – it is possible that this had been the case previously - 1995 saw the arrival of a new finance director 
and new auditors and after the flotation there was evidence given to the Tribunal of greater emphasis on positive 
earnings management within the company. 
57
 Per the finance director ‘We were driven by an ISO 9000 philosophy and system’ TR2 p 64 and p 108  
58
 Simclar entered administration in June 2011 owing over £40 million  pounds.  See The Herald Scotland  
(10/08/2012). Simclar fall from grace is laid bare in report. Available at: 
http://www.heraldscotland.com/business/company-news/simclar-fall-from-grace-is-laid-bare-in-
report.18555728. The liquidators of Simclar Ayrshire launched a commercial action against John Ian Durie, 
Sam Russell and Stephen Donnelly.  In April 2012, founder Sam Russel agreed to an out of court settlement re 
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predictable, if understandable, one, as reported in Accountancy Age on the 30
th
 of October 
2008. Vince Niblett, head of audit at Deloitte, said: 
 
‘Today's JDS report provides long overdue confirmation that there were no grounds to the 
complaints against Deloitte. Deloitte has maintained from day one that this disciplinary 
action was unmerited and we are pleased to have been fully exonerated. 
 
However, it is regrettable that it has taken almost eight years to conclude this enquiry since 
the matter was referred to the JDS in November 2000. The careers of a number of innocent 
individuals have been unfairly prejudiced by this enquiry hanging over them for so long. 
 
We take our audit responsibilities extremely seriously and the tribunal's finding is testament 
to our robust approach.’59 
 
Whilst one might sympathise with Mr Niblett’s views as to the delay which overcame the 
process (to which the fact that Deloitte & Touche sought and obtained a hearing seeking to 
strike out the complaints at a preliminary stage contributed to a degree, although it was not 
the major cause of the delay), not everyone would agree with his substantive point as to the 
quality of the audit undertaken. An alternative perspective delivered with the benefit of some 
inside knowledge would be that of Dan Wright, a director and, as we have seen, briefly CEO 
of Semple Cochrane: 
 
‘I think so much of the auditing profession is a waste of time which does nothing to stop 
businesses going bust or people being stitched up’…‘The disclaimer that all auditors use 
contains so many weasel words that you really have to ask what the value of their function is.  
Semple Cochrane was audited and it was audited again.  The board asked them [the auditors] 
to carry out further investigations and it still ended up as a complete shambles.’60 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
the payment of £3m dividends, after which a ‘Proof Before Answer’ was discharged, and associated scheduled 
hearing adjourned.  The Herald Scotland.  (15/04/2012). Director in court deal after row over £3m payments.  
Available at: http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/home-news/director-in-court-deal-after-row-over-3m-
payments.17243493.   
59
 http://www.accountancyage.com/aa/news/1779852/semple-cochrane-accountants-cleared#ixzz1Zo7mSELY 
60
 20 January 2002 available at  http://business.scotsman.com/wallstreetfraud/UK-auditors-under-fire-
in.2295651.jp. 
